

Motivation to Work in Russia: The Case of Protracted Transition from Noncompetitive to Competitive System

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Abstract: This paper aims to determine what challenges Russia faces upon transitioning to a competitive system.

As a main characteristic of the labour force, the motivation to work is studied in terms of three dimensions: 1) the value of current work, 2) orientation to a potential job, and 3) aspirations with respect to work. Analysis revealed the existence in Russia of homogeneous groups of workers, in terms of their motivation; this status quo is typical of both late-industrial and postindustrial societies. The author therefore argues for the complexity of ‘competitive areas’ and the simplicity of ‘noncompetitiveness’ in contemporary Russia. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic limitations to the proliferation of intrinsic and nonhygiene motivations on the one hand, and the predominance of monetary and extrinsic motivations on the other, provide evidence that one should consider Russia a country in protracted transition.

Keywords: transition, modernization, motivation to work, labour force, Russia

JEL Classification Numbers: O10, P29, P39

1. Introduction

More than 20 years ago, Russia initiated the structural reforms needed to build a new economy and, as it appeared later, even a new society. In the early 1990s, the old system of industrial relations was disrupted mainly for the sake of transition to a market economy; after the crisis of 1998, the goal of the ‘new’ Russia was broadened to gaining international competitiveness. In the mid-2000s, honoured scholars—and later, Russian officials—helped bring about a new objective, this time for the good of the whole of society. The modernization of Russia’s economy and society turned out to be a key issue in public discourse. In its failure to import Western institutions of market economy (Polterovich, 2001), throw off the so-called Dutch disease (Algieri, 2011), and move to industrial capitalism (Clark, 2006), Russia faced a double challenge: 1) to complete a transition that stalled in the late 1960s, when it sought to move from an industrial to late-industrial mode of development (Anikin, 2013), and 2) to become internationally competitive in the postindustrial world (Castells, 2004). Both of these objectives fall under the rubric of ‘modernization’.

This modernization is about to change the position place of Russia within the global system of labour division and reshape its role in international markets. To pass successfully through this qualitative transition, Russia's national labour force needs to be of a certain quality. Besides other issues, motivation is argued to be one of the basic labour-force characteristics to determine the chances of a country being successful in global competition for the key rents. The latter vary markedly in advanced and emerging economies alike, and they depend upon the occupational and industrial specializations of a given country. These rents might include ideas and new technologies produced by particular occupations (i.e. highly qualified professionals, like in United States, Western Europe, and Japan), low-cost productive forces based on qualified manual labour (China and South Korea), or even unique geo-climate conditions conducive to, say, farming and geological extractions (Brazil, Argentina, and Russia). Each of these rents requires that a labour force have different kinds of internal characteristics, and the motivation to work plays a central role.

In light of this, 'successful' modernization implies the embracing of a socioeconomic order that is characterized by innovative production and a well-developed service sector that is occupied by qualified workers who have 'competitive' attitudes toward their work. These attitudes have been found to correlate with late industrialization; societies that appeared to complete this stage successfully were classified by the well-known social theorists Devis and Moore (1945) as 'competitive systems'. In contrast, others—including the Soviet Union—were considered to be noncompetitive systems. Having inherited Soviet institutions (Clark, 2004), Russia needs to rid itself of motivational vestiges of an 'old' and noncompetitive system. If it is to be a global player, it needs to embrace a fundamentally new system that is competitive in a global societal context. This study aims to determine to what extent Russia has managed to cope with this double challenge over the two most recent decades.

2. Motivation to work and competitive systems, from a socioeconomic perspective

Although the literature on motivation has been vast, there remains a dearth of socioeconomic explorations of it, especially within the modernization framework. Motivation theory appears to comprise a traditional patrimony of psychological and managerial studies that are likely to obscure the issues of societal transition and modernization, save for rare exceptions (see Schwartz, 1997). Conventionally, psychologists have focused on those attributes of orientation to work that are rooted in an individual's personality (Maslow, 1954), and the extent to which job attitudes have any predictive power (Mayo, 1933; for further reading, see Brett and Drasgow, 2002 and Latham, 2012). Managerial studies tend to concentrate on industry needs and employer purposes (Scott and Gordon, 2005). Even the acknowledged study of Herzberg et al. (1959) about the motivation to work actually begins, in earnest, with an interest in the American

enterprises of the 1950s: 'Industry wants to know whether the worker's attitude toward his job makes any difference in the way he works or in his willingness to stick with it' (Herzberg et al., 1959, p. 7). Meanwhile, it is not rare for psychological and managerial approaches to combine in a study of the drivers of motivation and how to treat them.

Sociologists and economists usually leave this topic on the margins of their studies, thus leaving a gap in the literature; this gap becomes remarkable when analysing discipline-specific dictionaries that were created to serve as theoretical compasses for newcomers to certain fields of knowledge. One is surprised to find, for example, no mention of 'motivation' or 'motives' in such noteworthy studies as those of Scott and Gordon (2005), Ritzer (2007), Johnson (2000), and Magill et al. (1995); similarly, these terms lack representation even in the JEL classification system. Even in cases where such terms are found in a dictionary, 'motivation' is either described in terms of a psychological view, e.g. an energizer of behaviour (Jary and Jary, 2005), or reduced to sociobiology (Good, 2006). Economists focus on market-oriented aspects of motivation that are predicted on the basis of the effects of external economic variables, such as wages, income, unemployment, labour supply, and the national economy (Kaufman, 2002). However, we are less interested in particular characteristics that constitute work motivation, and more so in reasons for work within a socioeconomic context.

Generally speaking, in light of modernization, it is crucial to know 1) for what reasons people perform their current jobs, 2) what they value most in choosing a job, and 3) what images they have of 'ideal work'. All three of these dimensions of motivation to work can analytically reflect in the popular concepts of the 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' aspects of a job. An intrinsic motivation is thought to manifest as positive job attitudes that drive a person to work with greater productivity and lesser alienation; this motivation closely relates to occupational structure (Scott and Gordon, 2005; Watson, 2012) and the nature of the work (Fraser, 2002), and is associated with labour market transformations. An extrinsic motivation is closely related to so-called hygiene factors (Herzberg et al., 1959) such as supervision, interpersonal relations, physical working conditions, salary, company policies and administrative practices, benefits, job security, and the like. According to Herzberg and colleagues, when these factors 'deteriorate to a level below that which the employee considers to be acceptable, then job dissatisfaction ensues' (1959, p. 113).

Devis and Moore developed the concept of noncompetitive and competitive systems from the notion that any society is inevitably required to place and motivate individuals in the social structure: 'a competitive system gives greater importance to the motivation to achieve positions, whereas a non-competitive gives perhaps greater importance to the motivation to perform duties of the positions' (1945, pp. 242–243). Bearing in mind the major findings of many personality theorists (e.g. Jung, Alder, Sullivan, Rogers, and Goldstein), one might relate the motivations inherent in a competitive system to the individual's need for self-actualization or self-realization,

by way of one's work. That is, such 'achievable' motivation patterns seem to be driven from the ultimate goal of a person 'to fulfill himself as a creative, unique individual according to his own innate potentialities and within the limits of reality' (Herzberg et al., 1959, pp. 113–114). Deflecting from this goal makes man, as Jung says, 'a crippled animal' (Jung, 2010, p. 70).

The second type of motivation, 'to perform duties of the positions', could be considered a 'reproductive' motivation. The ultimate goal of a person here is to keep things unchanged in terms of either a simple or broader reproduction of the status held by one or one's family. This motivational pattern could be both keen and dominant, even when an individual socially expresses his or her wants and wishes to be creative and develop intensively in his or her work. Such a motivation is closely associated with a monetary-based orientation to work, as well as other kinds of extrinsic and hygienic motivations. Frankly speaking, any goals that involve the maintenance of one's status, relations, and environment (by, say, being included in specific work and consumption conditions) might be considered reproductive motivations that are central to noncompetitive systems.

However, as for the tendency for people to perform work to a certain quality standard and have a certain level of emotional involvement—and to perceive their jobs in terms of professional growth and career development—we may classify these as achievable motivation patterns that are basic to competitive systems. Such thinking is derived from Devis and Moore's (1945) finding that a competitive system is based upon differentiation of qualifications and redistribution of knowledge and skills that are needed for a society to fulfil a wide range of functions. Within this scope, modernization both facilitates rapid growth in those functions that are linked to status, and differentiates them by isolating these functions and corresponding positions from each other. The broader the list of these functions and the higher their specificity, the greater the number of reasons one has to regard a country as a 'modernized' one, i.e. late-industrialized. In this case, the uniqueness of one's qualification and knowledge determines the position of that person in the social hierarchy of a modernized society, making him or her more aware of his or her skills as their main rents (Grusky and Manwai, 2008). Those rents are transformed in an industrialized economy into a form of capital termed by behavioural economists as 'human capital'.

To occupy the jobs through which people might reap such qualification rents, an individual should demonstrate sufficient motivation. For example, it could be considered 'rational' to work to acquire the knowledge and skills revealed in the course of job-seeking to be essential, and to encourage both regular investments and positive capital returns on previously acquired education and work experience. Nevertheless, neither this kind of motivation nor related strategies are available to all; in a given case, one's ability to take this tack depends less on agency level and more on structural factors, such as labour markets and a country's place in the global economy. Motivation plays a structural role only when the worker is already ranked within an appropriate 'class situation' (Weber, 1991, p. 181); it intensifies in a postindustrial society, where the

competitive motivation to work becomes a 'stairway to heaven' for some, and a pointless waste of time and effort for others. The transition to a postindustrial economy therefore evokes a 'qualification gap' that alienates a small group of highly qualified workers (i.e. the 'core' labour force) from the other employees, both qualified and unskilled, who comprise what Castells (2004) considers a 'generic' workforce.

A postindustrial economy stupendously favours the core labour force for its exclusive qualifications, which prompt the members therein to improve their skills. Generic workers are occupied in jobs that require lack of special skills (Stalder, 2006); as a result, the majority of workers therein are scarcely expected to increase their qualifications in the work process, or to develop themselves or make achievements; they are therefore latently encouraged to produce patterns of 'noncompetitive' motivation. Incidentally, this motivation is traditionally associated in structural theory with the lower classes, which are usually engaged in manual labour. The proliferation of such patterns into a wider social context of a postindustrial economy is followed by the shrinkage of the 'new middle class' of late-industrial modernity, and subsequent categorization into the aforementioned groups. From this viewpoint, it seems to be too early to speak of processes such as these in contemporary Russia, as the 'new middle class' of Russia is just establishing its unique socioeconomic contours (Hayashi, 2007). The emergence of a new middle class comprising managers, professionals, semi-professionals, and other groups of nonmanual workers—those who supposedly demonstrate competitive motivation—is traditionally treated as a key indicator of societal transition to a late-industrial mode of development (Mills, 1951). The Russian middle class is taking the shape of a group that is 'overly new', due to its remarkable heterogeneity: it consists of both a tiny core (between 12% and 15% of the whole population) and a massive periphery (40%), as explored by Tikhonova and Mareeva (2009). The social borders that contain these subgroups of the Russian middle class are likely to coincide with the future demarcation lines between information workers and the clerical proletariat. Thus, in social and cultural contexts, the symptoms of both late- and postindustrial economy may produce in Russia a hybrid of motivational systems.

3. Russia: between transformation and transition; quality of Russian work force, in light of modernization

The existence in Russia of such socio-cultural hybrids might be an indicator of protracted transition (By 'protracted', we refer to transition that is stable in its incompleteness). In light of the above discussion, transition can be considered complete when necessary qualitative changes (transformations) have manifest. Burawoy (2001) insists on differentiating the terms 'transformation' and 'transition'; in his opinion, in any context—i.e. social, economic, or political—does Russia demonstrate an involutory 'transition without transformation'.


Table 1. Occupational structure in Russia, 1994–2010, % of employees

Wave	1994	1995	1996	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total, N	4,724	4,403	4,073	3,706	3,554	3,699	3,660	3,615	3,730	3,485	4,654	4,608	4,464	4,299	7,712
0. Armed forces*	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.1	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5
1. Officials, managers, entrepreneurs	4	5	3.9	4	5.1	6	5.3	4	4.3	4.4	4.1	5	3.6	3.7	3.2
2. Professionals	13.6	11.5	12.4	12.6	12	12.4	11.8	12.6	12.9	12.2	12.7	13.5	12.5	13.2	15.3
3. Technicians and associate professionals (semi-professionals)	13.4	14	14.6	15.4	14.8	14.9	16.5	16.6	16	17.2	17.3	16.2	18.5	18.9	19.2
4. Office workers, clerks	6.9	7.6	7.4	8	7.3	7.5	8.1	7.8	6.9	6.7	7.3	7.1	7.3	6.9	6.8
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers	8.2	9	9.3	9.4	10.3	10.2	9.8	10.7	10.5	10.7	10.5	11.5	11.3	11.9	12.3
6. Agricultural and fishery workers	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
7. Craft and related trades workers	16.7	16.6	16.1	14.4	15.2	15.3	14.9	14.8	15	14.7	13.9	14.5	13.4	12.7	12.6
8. Plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers	20.9	21	19.3	19.9	19.7	19.3	19	18	19.2	18.4	17.9	16.5	16.9	15.3	15.5
9. Elementary occupations (unskilled workers)	14.5	13.7	15	14.7	13.8	13	13.2	14.3	14.1	14.6	15.1	14.7	15.6	16.5	14.2

Note: Calculations were done while using 1994–2010 data culled from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE), conducted by the National Research University Higher School of Economics and ZAO ‘Demoscope’, together with the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, headed by Barry M. Popkin, and the Institute of Sociology RAS (Polina Kozyreva and Mikhail Kosolapov). RLMS is a series of nationally representative surveys designed to monitor the effects of Russian reforms on the health and economic welfare of households and individuals within the Russian Federation. Data have been collected 19 times since 1992; of these, 15 represent the RLMS Phase II (<http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rhms-hse>) RLMS-HSE representative extracts.

* Occupational groups are calculated on the basis of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88), which is the ILO’s main classification scheme vis-à-vis occupations. As a result, ISCO-88 is widely used in a number of datasets. The RLMS database is distributed with computed variables, in which occupations are already coded and aggregated according to the Classification of Occupations ISCO-88, based on rules developed in Geneva in 1988 and without any adaptation to Russian realities. ISCO-88 was adapted by the author (Anikin, 2009).

Figure 1. Skills that Russian workers use in their work, 2010, % of employee




Source: Data were taken from the results of the survey, ‘Is Russian society ready for modernization?’, undertaken by the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Science in 2010 (see http://www.isras.ru/analytical_report_modernization.html).

Essentially, transition—especially when we speak of system transition—is like moving to a market economy, in that it implies transformation *a priori*. However, transformation can exist in the absence of transition. Writing of the transformations that have failed to occur in Russia, Burawoy stresses the indicators of directed change that could be attributed to the pivotal features of a new transition phase. He argues that Russia completed its first transformational phase before 1998, and afterwards switched to transition. The first stage of transformation might also be considered a transitional phase (Kapas and Czegledi, 2007); thus, we speak of ‘protracted transition’ in terms of the deviation of a country from the qualitative transformations inherent in a competitive system, within a late- or postindustrial context.

These deviations can be easily seen from the perspective of occupational structure dynamics. The Russian population showed some major tendencies vis-à-vis occupational structure over the 1994–2010 period (see Table 1). Principally, they are as follows:

- Continuous growth in the number of semi-skilled and low-qualified nonmanual workers (up to 140%)
- A tenuous change in the labour force share of professionals
- Unsteady growth in the managerial group, with a high level of inherent instability within this group
- On-going reduction in the number of qualified manual workers who are basically employed as plant and machine operators, assemblers, and drivers

Figure 2. Skills that Russians of different occupations use in their work, 2006,% of employees



Source: Data were taken from the results of the survey, 'Is Russian society ready for modernization?', undertaken by the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Science in 2010 (see: http://www.isras.ru/analytical_report_modernization.html). Statistically significant results are shown in bold ($\alpha < 0.05$).

On the whole, the quantitative indices shown indicate the Russian economy's deindustrialization and the simultaneous deskilling of its workforce. This means that by looking at the Russian population's occupational structure, one can define the model inherent in the Russian economy's development as belonging to neither the late nor early industrial types. The Russian economy is in a transitional stage, between these two types; this is demonstrated by the incompleteness of the formation of the population's occupational structure, reflected not only in the dynamics relating to a large size of some professional groups, but also in a lack of stability in the inner composition of some occupations (managerial staff, for example) and, moreover, a lack of homogeneity among semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers (Anikin, 2013).

Information regarding the Russian labour force can be gathered by exploring those skills typically used by Russian employees in their work. A basic skill that also reflects modernity is competence in working on a computer. Bearing in mind that information technology today should serve as a basis for economic development, the data represented in Figures 1 and 2 allow us to argue for the incapacity of the Russian labour force to be fully competitive in international markets. As we see in those figures, the work of the majority of Russians (58%) does not require the use of computer skills or foreign-language skills, separately or in combination.

Incidentally, these issues are statistically significant, and not solely for manual workers. In contemporary Russian economy, the number of jobs involving nonmanual labour (which comprises 65–85% of the labour force, by occupational group: see Figure 2) requires the use of computer skills—although in developed countries, the use of computers in fulfilling almost all their jobs has become commonplace, and even obligatory among professionals. Meanwhile, there is not much call for the use of any foreign language in the Russian economy: even among specialists and managers, 71–74% of workers do not use language knowledge and skills in the course of fulfilling their work duties—this, despite the fact that Russian graduates should know a foreign language (primarily English) on at least an intermediate level, according to the formal requirements of the national educational system. Therefore, the structure of the workplaces, as seen in Russia after the 1990s, does not mesh even with an acquired component of human capital; as a result, conditions are ripe for the partial dequalification of Russian professionals. As shown below, Russian professionals can be split into two main groups, in accordance with their motivational patterns.

These issues are also of concern to managers, a notable share of whom do not use information technology in their work (see Figure 2). However, this feature hardly relates to the specifics of their work; rather, it relates mainly to the low quality of human capital among the majority of these individuals. For example, 58% of both executives and line managers whose work does not require the use of a computer demonstrate an education level lower than vocational education and training (VET) or career and technical education (CTE); 68% of them have not taken steps to improve their professional skills over the three most recent years.

In light of these facts, it should be noted that an individual's personal attitude vis-à-vis improvements to his or her acquired human capital could be considered an appropriate criterion by which to assess the modernization of the Russian economy, within the context of the readiness of Russian employees to make those improvements. The point here is that the refusal by employees in general and management in particular to undertake continuous education and renew human capital is supposedly a stumbling block in Russia's achievement of long-term competitiveness in international markets.


Moreover, when we compare how various workers renew their human capital, a variety of motivations are made apparent (Anikin, 2010). Managers and office workers usually hone their skills, while specialists are likely to obtain new experiences and knowledge in order to push the boundaries of their already-acquired qualifications. This fundamental difference takes us closer to the structural prerequisites of modernization that are concentrated in a very insular segment of the Russian economy. Apparently, only specialists' activities can help in forming a personality that is prepared to fully face the challenges of modernization within the field of industrial relations. Even so, the motivation in enhancing one's own human capital relates poorly to the typical investment goals of developed economies. In Russia, the relationship between human capital and earned incomes is fairly weak; rather, these motivations relate to attitudes toward work.

Both occupational changes and the quality of the Russian labour force reveal a transformation, without revolution or evolution transition of Russia to a stage of late-industrial development. In light of such tendencies, we expect the dominance of hygiene and extrinsic aspects of motivation within the Russian economy; this is supposedly typical of a semi- or low-qualified labour force. At the same time, however, we hope to find a competitive motivation that might be divided into two parts: the competitive motivation of a late-industrial economy, or the motivational patterns of a postindustrial reality. Social conservatism—and even the exclusion of competitive motivation in Russia, which might be possible by virtue of the continuous growth in the number of poorly qualified nonmanual workers—will indicate a state of protracted transition.

4. Perception of work in contemporary Russia: between monetary and self-realization patterns

How do Russians see their work and jobs? According to the data used here, for a very large majority of Russian employees (93%), work is considered first as a source of income; this attitude is quite stable (see Figure 3). Meanwhile, as expected, the presence of this type of work motivation depends upon 1) occupational status, 2) the kind of economic activity involved, and 3) the type of property owned by the employer. Those Russians who assess their work through the prism of money tend to be occupied in manual labour positions (96%). What is important to

Figure 3. What do Russians think of their current work? 2010, % of employees



Note: Answers were in response to the question ‘What is your current work for you?’ Up to three responses were permitted.

note here, however, is that the perception of work as a source of income does not usually exclusively connote low economic status; moreover, it does not even correlate with earnings (Anikin, 2010).

Relative to income, most other types of work motivation, it seems, are scarcely found in the Russian economy. The most infrequently cited motivational pattern is to consider work as a way of either attaining a new profession, or improving qualifications (only 11% of the employed population in Russia). This should be considered a key point when we speak of transitioning from a noncompetitive system to a competitive one. In other words, either the majority of jobs in contemporary Russia do not demand skills improvement, or Russian employees do not even bear in mind that their work can have an effect on acquired qualifications. The main pattern of competition in contemporary Russia cannot be attributed to a ‘competitive system’, as either there is no competition for the positions within the qualification hierarchy, or this competition is not fully recognized and rationalized by Russian employees.

Meanwhile, there is a noticeable capacity inherent in the Russian labour force: there is room for the number of employees who cite the qualification aspect of work motivation to triple. We could argue this primarily by virtue of the ‘self-development’ aspect of work, which is directly linked to the job performed for at least one-third of Russia’s employed population. Due to the

existence in Russia of a controversial gap in the motivational aspects that relate to the performed job—and in noticing that the ‘self-development’ aspect of a job is the second most frequently cited motivation in people’s work—it seems to make sense to speak of transition. All things being equal, since 35% of Russia’s labour force values its work by virtue of mostly nonhygiene factors, there are a number of jobs in Russia that make it economically and socially possible for employees to focus on their personality while avoiding becoming a Jungian ‘crippled animal’. Figure 3 shows that people realize these possibilities, and formulate and separate them from other aspects of a job, hygienic and nonhygienic alike. This could be considered a noteworthy characteristic of Russia’s competitive system: hygiene factors relate to positive motivation, and therefore to higher productivity and greater achievement. In light of this, what social backgrounds align with this kind of intrinsic motivational pattern?

Perceptions of work as a source of self-development and self-realization are common among entrepreneurs and the self-employed (64%), qualified specialists (54%), managers (58%), and to a lesser extent clerks (46%); such perceptions are also seen exceptionally among simple positions in sales and service, and industrial manual workers (24% and 21%, respectively). These figures are noteworthy, particularly in light of a growing number of service workers and shop and market/sales workers, and other representatives of Russia’s nonmanual semi-qualified labour force, and the relatively small number of intellectuals, which has changed slightly over the most recent 15–20 years. Such a pattern of intrinsic and nonhygienic motivation aimed toward self-development, self-actualization, and self-realization might be localized in minor groups within the national labour force. In line with Castells (2004), such a localized pattern could be interpreted as a normal indicator of transformation in both industrial relations and occupational structure, as found within a postindustrial economy. However, since Russia has not yet surpassed its late-industrial phase, the socio-professional ‘conservation’ of the self-development aspect of work motivation seems to reduce Russia’s chances of finally becoming fully modernized.

5. Modernist orientations to jobs in Russia

It is more effective to evaluate other dimensions of work motivation, such as attitudes to one’s job. These dimensions might include those items in the following list of issues that are generally important to people when choosing a job:

- Opportunities to acquire new knowledge and skills
- Good reputation of the enterprise, organization, or firm
- Amount of salary
- Guaranteed work (i.e. low risk of being laid off or ‘downsized’)
- Convenient operating schedule

Table 2. What is most important to Russians when choosing a job? 2006, % of employees

	Salary	Opportunities to acquire knowledge and skills	Reputation of a firm	Job stability	Convenient operating schedule	Interesting creative job	Comfortable location	Alignment of job and individual's abilities	Good relationships with colleagues	Social guarantees	Career development	Work conditions
% total	98 N = 6,406	66 N = 4,279	85 N = 5,502	93 N = 6,073	88 N = 5,701	70 N = 4,491	72 N = 4,683	85 N = 5,520	94 N = 6,088	77 N = 4,978	64 N = 4,112	94 N = 6,087
1. Officials, managers, entrepreneurs	80 +++	92 +++	92 +++	82 +++	88 +++	82 +++	92 +++	92 +++	77 +++	77 +++	77 +++	94 +++
2. Professionals	84 +++	93 +++	93 +++	88 +++	90 ++	79 +++	94 +++	95 +	95 +	75 +++	75 +++	95 ++
3. Technicians and associate professionals (semi-professionals)	80 +++	91 +++	91 +++	95 +	90 ++	79 +++	74 +	91 +++	91 +	75 +++	75 +++	95 ++
4. Office workers, clerks	70 +	88 +	88 +	93 +++	93 +++	74 +	78 ++	96 +	96 +	80 +	68 ++	96 +
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers							75 +			80 +		
6. Agricultural and fishery workers												
7. Craft and related trades workers	61 --	82 --	82 --	84 ---	84 ---	65 --	67 --				58 ---	
8. Plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers	53 ---	78 ---	78 ---	85 -	85 -	57 ---	68 --	81 ---	92 --		54 ---	
9. Elementary occupations	48 ---	74 ---	74 ---	89 ---	89 ---	52 ---	73 ---	73 ---	91 ---		48 ---	90 ---

Source: RLMS-HSE dataset of 2006.

Note: The question was 'For you personally, how important are the following aspects when choosing a job?' Each of the categories was evaluated by the respondents on a five-point Likert scale anchored by 1 ('not at all important') and 5 ('very important'). Table 2 represents the responses aggregated for 'slightly important' and 'very important'. Only statistically significant results are shown. The following symbols are used in the table: «+», rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the variables on the significance level $\alpha < 0.05$. The same is for «++», $\alpha < 0.01$, and for «+++», $\alpha < 0.001$. Similar logic holds for the 'minus' numbers. The symbol «-» indicates a negative *Adj. Res.* value. Although a chi-squared test does not provide us with information on the direction or strength of a relationship between two variables, due to symmetry of cross-tabulations, one can rely on 'large' negative *Adj. Res.* values, and consider them information on the events and states that are statistically less possible for certain categories.

Table 3. Three main factors of job orientation among Russians, 2006

Aspects of a job	Factors		
	1 Self-development and growth	2 Convenient conditions and comfort	3 Materialistic orientations
Opportunities to acquire new knowledge and skills	0.876		
Interesting and creative work	0.762		
Chances for career advancement	0.743		
Reputation of a firm	0.651		
Alignment of job and individual's abilities	0.544		
Convenience of location		0.811	
Convenient operating schedule		0.693	
Good relationships with colleagues		0.643	
Work conditions		0.628	
Social guarantees		0.611	
Amount of salary			0.842
Job stability			0.757

Note: Table 3 shows factor loadings, and it is suggested that they being interpreted as correlation coefficients in correlation analysis. The categories of each section are sorted in descending order of factor-loading values, to the cut-off value of 0.5 (which explains the empty cells in the table). Of these, factor 1 contributed most, by way of the category 'Opportunities to acquire new knowledge and skills' (0.876); factor 2, by way of 'Convenience of location of an enterprise, organization, or a firm' (0.811); and factor 3, by way of 'Amount of salary' (0.842).

- Interesting and creative work
- Convenience of location
- Alignment of job and individual's abilities, skills, and inclinations
- Good relationships with colleagues
- Acceptable benefits, like free trips, additional medical care, and nutrition
- Chances for career advancement
- Good work conditions

From the viewpoint of multiple theoretical traditions, these issues are assumed to describe the range of possible aspects of work motivation that might be important for an individual when he or she chooses a job. Are there groups of employees that are homogeneous in terms of such preferences? If so, which of these indicate motivational patterns that speak to modernity? These questions are addressed in this section.

Technically, such questions have been addressed through data clustering and the further juxtaposition of those results with the actual occupational structure. Incidentally, occupation status is statistically significant in revealing the strength of preference vis-à-vis the given characteristics, especially when we speak of 'extreme' points of occupational structure (see Table 2). Since it is rather difficult to define homogenous groups from the raw data presented in Table 2, factor analysis was undertaken prior to clustering.

The calculations inherent in the factor analysis procedure are presented in Table 3. According to those calculations, in Russia, all attitudes toward work can be divided into three categories of underlying factors that determine people's choice of job. Our findings allow us to revise Goldthorpe's (1969) paradigm of three ideal-typical orientations to work (i.e. instrumental, solidaristic, and bureaucratic). Factor 1 is 'Attitudes toward self-development and growth at work'. It encompasses all the characteristics that describe the orientations of Russians toward self-development and some other nonmaterial aspects of a job. This factor primarily comprises the following preferences: a) opportunities to acquire new knowledge and skills, b) an interesting and creative job, c) chances for career advancement, and d) an alignment between a job's duties and the individual's abilities. Factor 2 is 'Attitudes toward convenient conditions and comfort', and it involves all aspects of work and employment conditions: a) convenient location, b) convenient operating schedule, c) good relationships with colleagues, d) work conditions, and e) acceptable benefits. These are also known as Herzberg et al.'s (1959) hygiene factors of motivation. Factor 3 is 'Materialistic orientation toward work'. As the name suggests, this factor comprises preferences vis-à-vis a) amount of salary, and b) guaranteed work.

The existence of these factors is a salient analytical indicator that, in the minds of Russians, 'self-development', 'hygienic', and 'monetarist' orientations toward work are quite distinct from each other. It could be said that the presence of one more essential condition would allow us to say that modernization is taking place in Russia; that condition relates to the existence of homogenous groups, with a predominance of traits that are suggestive of late-industrial society. In social practice, all these factors present in a mixed form. Incidentally, four clusters can be found on the basis of the aforementioned factors of work orientation in contemporary Russia; three of them are similar, in that the individuals therein are grouped in terms of the work characteristics they do not consider important when choosing a job. The fourth cluster, instead, groups people in terms of the characteristics they *do* consider important (see Table 4).

By more closely examining the socioeconomic traits of these four clusters, it is easier to garner

Table 4. Motivational clusters in Russia, 2006

Factors of attitudes to work	Clusters			
	1 (Idealists-PI)	2 (Utilitarians)	3 (Pragmatists)	4 (Modernists-LI)
Self-development and growth	−.020	−.132	<i>1.500</i>	−.629
Convenient conditions and comfort	.239	<i>1.093</i>	−.449	−.711
Materialistic orientations	<i>1.578</i>	−.535	−.379	−.315
N (valid = 6,345, missing = 206)	1,288	1,660	1,118	2,279
%	20	26	18	36

Note: The cluster centres are shown in Table 4. Calculations of the cluster centres are based on the average values of the motivational factors, which vary from −3 ('very important') to +3 ('not at all important'). According to the initial category coding—i.e. from 1 ('not at all important') to 5 ('very important')—a large negative factor value approaching −3 indicates its large contribution to the cluster, and vice versa.

a better understanding of the analytical issues and practicalities at work in decision-making in relation to jobs in Russia.

Cluster 1 (idealists-postindustrial [PI], 20%) comprises Russians who are not oriented toward money or economic stability when choosing a job; this is the basic characteristic by which these people are considered homogenous in terms of motivation. At the same time, convenience and comfort of work similarly fulfil the same role—just as self-development and opportunities for self-realization, and opportunities for career and professional growth—do. This is a cluster comprising 'grandfathers and sons', as it gathers Russians under 20, together with those over the age of 50 years. In comparison to the whole of the population, there is no statistical difference in education level among these people, or in their practices vis-à-vis acquired human capital. Thus, the motivational attitudes of idealists-PI are not driven by the labour market or job requirements, but rather by the particular orientation of these people to life, which is considered mainly a function of their free will. In light of modernization theory, we could consider these Russians as those who are approaching the postindustrial motivation to work. However, their motivation has not yet become competitive in nature, due to the poor relationship within this cluster between intentions and education/qualifications.

Cluster 2 (utilitarians, 26%) consists of those Russians who place an emphasis on money, although they do concede that the realization of professional goals is important to them as an aspect of work. Meanwhile, they notably disregard the issues of comfort of work, social atmosphere, and work conditions. These are young (21–30 years; 31%) and mostly male (58%) Russians who are currently employed by companies in the construction, transportation, and communications industries. Both the innovative character of these branches of Russian industry

and the average salary levels there might explain the socioeconomic localization of this motivation and the desire of workers to maximize their profits in being professionals.

Cluster 3 (pragmatists, 18%) encompasses those Russians for whom professional growth and creative realization are not overly important; what is most important for these individuals are ‘mercantile’ interests, such as work conditions, low risk of losing work, and salary. The majority of ‘pragmatists’ consists of ‘fathers’ over the age of 40 (65%) and poorly educated employees (75% have attained secondary education or lower); more than one-half of them work in manual labour. The members of this motivational cluster are likely to be working in civil engineering, agriculture, and housing and communal services. These branches of Russian industry are arranged on a slightly innovative basis, with there being low salaries and few opportunities to develop the human capital of qualified workers; therefore, many of them may consider these jobs rearmost to be employed in. In fact, this is the only cluster where motivation to work strongly correlates with workers qualification level, as well as with their preferences in accumulation and upgrading of human capital. The pragmatic attitudes toward work within this cluster are likely shaped on the basis of actual life conditions, where education does not necessarily result in rent. In general, this cluster is significantly characterized by an acute sense of uselessness with regards to the nature of their jobs. In other words, the mercantile motivation is socioeconomically predicted by both the human and labour alienation of people, rather than by their free will.

Cluster 4 (modernists-late industrial [LI], 36%) consists of those Russians for whom professional and creative orientations vis-à-vis their jobs are more prevalent than money-based ones—although money naturally is an issue for them. What is noteworthy here is that this cluster within our model contains the greatest number of individuals: over one-third of the valid sample (i.e. 36% of the working population). This cluster predominantly comprises women (59%) and members of the middle-age generation (i.e. those aged 20–40 years; 57%). It is remarkable that 44% of Russians employed in such qualification-intensive industries as finance and intellectual consulting, are typical representatives of this cluster. Due to their rational orientation regarding all work aspects—with an emphasis on nonhygiene factors—these people might be considered the ‘social essentials’ of late industrialization. Unlike cluster 1, modernists-LI are denoted by their partially competitive motivation, which derive from their achievement-related orientation.

Thus, in Russia, any intrinsic motivation vis-à-vis work is likely to be shaped by disregarding any monetary motivation in the course of job-seeking. That is, in two of the aforementioned clusters, monetary motivations run directly counter to attitudes favouring self-development at work; in the two other clusters, they co-exist with self-development attitudes, but do not play a visible role in shaping clusters. Let us now consider the analytical conclusion that the social agency of Russian modernization tends to be reflected in the preponderance of these various groups, while bearing in mind that this modernization agency will be primarily represented by

Table 5. Occupations and motivational clusters in Russia, 2006, % within the clusters


	Clusters			
	1 Idealists-PI	2 Utilitarians	3 Pragmatists	4 Modernists-LI
1. Officials, managers, entrepreneurs	4	6 ++	2 ---	5
2. Professionals	13	15 ++	4 ---	15 +++
3. Semi-professionals	16	18	10 ---	21 +++
4. Office workers, clerks	9	6 --	7	9
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers	11	9 --	10	13 ++
7. Craft and related trades workers	12 -	15 +	15	13 ---
8. Plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers	17	17	26 +++	14 ---
9. Elementary occupations	16	13 --	26 +++	10 ---

Note: Agricultural and fishery workers are excluded from both Tables 5 and 6, due to a lack of observations. This may explain why the columns do not add up precisely to 100%.

Table 6. Occupations and motivational clusters in Russia, 2006, % within the occupations

	Clusters			
	1 Idealists-PI	2 Utilitarians	3 Pragmatists	4 Modernists-LI
1. Officials, managers, entrepreneurs	18	34 ++	7 ---	41
2. Professionals	22	30 ++	5 ---	43 +++
3. Semi-professionals	19	28	10 ---	43 +++
4. Office workers, clerks	23	22 --	16	40
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers	21	22 --	17	41 ++
7. Craft and related trades workers	18 -	30 +	19	34
8. Plant and machine operators, assemblers and drivers	20	25	26 +++	28 ---
9. Elementary occupations	22	23 --	31 +++	24 ---

Figure 4. Ideal orientations to jobs of Russians, 2003–2012, % of total population



Source: Data were taken from the results of the survey, ‘Dreams of Russians (sociologists thoughts)’, undertaken by the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Science in 2012 (see: http://www.isras.ru/analytical_report_o_chem_mechtayut_rossiyane.html).

middle-aged Russians who are employed in highly competitive sectors of Russia’s national economy.

With respect to motivation, no occupation can be expected to act as a social marker of Russian modernization (see Tables 5 and 6). Moreover, a remarkable proportion of Russia’s manual workers are motivated even in an ‘anti-modernistic’ way, given how they tend to disregard self-development and growth when seeking a job. Incidentally, Russian management—which is expected to generate opportunities for national enterprises by helping them make large contributions to the global economy—remains the most unstable occupational group to have high qualification heterogeneity (Anikin, 2013). Additionally, more than one-third of Russian managers are characterized by utilitarian motivational patterns when job-seeking; their poor drive to self-development makes the managers more closely resemble Russian manual workers, though the incomes of the latter group can hardly be predicted in terms of their human capital.

Both Russian manual workers and managers differ from professionals. According to our findings presented in previous sections, Russian specialists could be considered the main social agency of the national modernization model, given their homogeneity; in reality, they are strictly divided, tending to have either traditional or modernist motivational patterns. Those with modernist patterns, for instance, much more closely resemble semi-professionals and even sales workers, by virtue of their motivation. Thus, work attitudes—measured as a possible motivational dimension of the labour force—appear to play a greater role in bringing about solidarity, compared to the differential function of Russia’s labour division system.

6. ‘Ideal work’: dreams about work in contemporary Russia

This statement about solidarity is well-illustrated by data regarding Russians’ dreams with respect to their work. In terms of their dreams, it appears that every other Russian citizen is

moved by intrinsic motivation (see Figure 4). Moreover, intrinsic motivation is presented in their minds as a socio-cultural norm that was weakened not even by the financial crisis of 2008–2011. Save for a few exceptions, this norm is not generally predicted by settlement type, occupation status, or other socio-demographic characteristics like age or education. Additionally, these socio-demographic characteristics relate to extreme points of socioeconomic inequality in contemporary Russia: the externalization of socio-cultural norms of intrinsic motivation is more intensive among Russian youngsters aged 18–25 (64%), as well as among those who have ever been part of the higher education system (from 66% to 74%, depending upon the educational degree).

Monetary motivation in Russia, as shown, is no longer a socio-cultural norm or part of dreams, generally speaking. Since it so strongly correlates with low socioeconomic status and alienation, this motivation exists in Russia as an inevitable perception of certain social groups of what should be the driving force behind labour. Here, there is a socioeconomic concentration of monetary motivation that is associated with the noncompetitive parts of contemporary Russia; at the same time, this motivation needs to be analytically separated from socio-cultural predictions of such motivation. We speak of the socio-cultural dimension of monetary motivations when people express a monetary orientation with respect to work, without attributing it to low socioeconomic status or an otherwise vital need for money. Thus, the socio-cultural context here is somewhat controversial—that is, while taking into account earlier results, at least one-half of the Russian workforce is characterized by a discrepancy between what they think about their current work and how they consider the work in general. Dialectically, this could be the case only if the given discrepancy does not exist in a form of antinomy or conflict. In other words, regarding this discrepancy between monetary-based attitude toward one's current job and intrinsic motivation toward one's ideal work, these patterns are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, this mental discrepancy on one hand, and social combination on the other hand, might be social indicators of modernization; according to the findings above, such indicators are likely to be found in about 36% of Russia's national labour force. This motivational combination could also be considered a sign that Russia is adopting a competitive system.


The nature of this combination is made more clear in Figure 5. The majority of Russians dream about having work for which they would be well-paid, and which would be interesting for them and performed in a comfort environment. This means that Russia is now in the 'recovery stage' from both the socio-cultural crisis and the resulting anomie of the 1990s (Lapin, 1992). People in Russia have come to realize that a job is not just about making money; they have come to internalize the value of what they do during the day. Their thinking in this respect has gone far beyond the 'here and now'. In these three images of 'ideal' work, we recognize the respect that people are giving to their own personalities. Russians tend to see work as the most time-consuming part of their lives, and in compensation for their efforts, they ask for more than

Figure 5. What is ideal work for Russians? 2012, % of total population

Source: *Ibid.* The question was ‘What are the criteria for an ideal job, i.e. the job of your dreams?’ Up to three responses were permitted.

just money: they ask also for the right to satisfy their ultimate need to be a human, not Berdyaev’s ‘machine’ (1934, pp. 31-64) or Jung’s ‘crippled animal’.

Frankly speaking, the orientations of Russians with respect to work and each of money, personal interest, and labour conditions reveal their intentions to provide themselves with a sufficient level of ‘being’. Such intrinsic factors as professional growth at work and the creative content of their work appear to be parts of the ‘second-order’ motivational patterns that are actualized only after first-order conditions have been sufficiently met. However, as shown above, there might be a number of obstacles to the proliferation of such patterns: 1) the quality of an individual’s human capital, 2) the complexity and creativity inherent in an occupational activity, 3) labour market and production forces, and 4) one’s societal attitude vis-à-vis achievement and development. As shown above, the given types of motivation are likely to be expressed primarily by the qualified labour force, which tends to have an effective attitude with regard to its human capital. In any case, there seems to be a conspicuous lack of positions

Figure 6. What is ideal occupation for Russians? 2012, % of total population

Source: *Ibid.* The question was ‘What determines your choice of a particular occupation, of where you dream to work?’ Up to three responses were permitted.

within the Russian economy that call for high-level qualifications and involve complex labour. As a result, only a few employees can apply for these occupations and thus demonstrate the relative motivation to attain highly innovative, creative, and globally competitive work (see Figure 6).

Occupational projections of the ‘ideal work’ about which Russians dream reveal how workers estimate their own life chances. For example, generally speaking, people will not hold an occupation that demands a high range of competitiveness in accordance with worldwide economic development, if they either know nothing of the global division of labour and international competition, or have no such experience, either personally or socially. The same is true with regard to the potential for a high level of innovation in a job, as well as its creative and innovative character. According to Figure 6, career/professional growth and creativity at work are estimated by people as aspects that come from two different socioeconomic realities: they require different kinds of effort and therefore imply a constellation of environmental constraints.

The first of these two socioeconomic realities might be considered that of late-industrial society,

while the second one relates to the postindustrial world. The late-industrial world centres around general opportunities to stabilize life within a number of social groups (e.g. the middle class) and support human development and achievements. Incidentally, Devis and Moore (1945) write about such a reality. The postindustrial epoch is devoted to the creation of a pool of 'individualized' opportunities while focusing mainly on the development of unique human potential among individuals and minorities, rather than on the allocation of standardized capacities among large social groups. However, unlike with late-industrial society, this development is not passive. Because of industrialization, people now have access to a matrix of opportunities (continuous education, information technologies, geographic mobility, and the like), where they are left to their own efforts and motives. It is for this reason that we speak of self-development in light of revisions to Devis and Moore's (1945) concept of noncompetitive and competitive systems.

7. Conclusions

The reforms that have taken place in post-Soviet Russia have become sufficiently refined, so that the challenges the country now faces relate to socioeconomics and modernization. In general, the Russian economy is scarcely prepared to overcome these challenges; the lack of a labour force of a certain quality remains a stumbling block. As a prime feature of its labour force, the motivation to work in Russia has been found to be a transitive one. On one hand, for the majority of Russian employees, motivation to work often relates to money, as well as to work and process conditions. In areas where motivation to work cannot be determined by virtue of labour markets and socioeconomic status, Russia is seen as constituting a noncompetitive system for up to 42–44% of Russia's working population. On the other hand, there are remarkable signs in contemporary Russia of more and more people being motivated by self-development and achievement. These motivation-based signs of nascent competitive systems are partially fostered by societal norms; for one-third of Russia's population, they are promoted by labour markets and industrial relations.

With regard to a 'modernistic' motivation to work, its reality is evidenced by its mixed nature. On a social basis, attitudes toward self-development are followed by 'hygienic' and 'monetarist' orientations to work, although in the minds of Russians, they exist as separate items. As a feature of the late-industrial stage of development, this motivation pattern reveals the ultimate need for people to be human beings at work, and not 'crippled animals'. However, in this struggle to find job opportunities that satisfy personality-based needs, people may miss the salient points of a competitive system, such as an idealistic motivation to find creative work, to engage in qualification-intensive labour, and to seek occupational relevance in international markets (i.e. motives pertaining to a postindustrial economy). These changes are taking place in

contemporary Russia: as was shown, professional growth (cited by 32–35% of workers) and creativity at work (7–11%) are considered by people to be aspects that come from two different socioeconomic realities, and that require different efforts; the implication is that there will be a number of environmental constraints. As a result, such postindustrial types of motivation will be concentrated in outlier areas of society and should not be considered a social force that will support any qualitative leap. Such types of motivation could be taken up and expanded by groups that are currently engaged in more pressing issues, like being appropriately compensated for their labour. For these reasons, transitive motivations as found in Russia are suspected to be protracted ones.

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